Based on the Constructivist theoretical approach for analyzing international relations by identifying the forces which influence states behavior, this article compares major junctions in Spain's international status and the way systemic changes influenced the course of Spanish-Israeli relations. 
INTRODUCTION
In spite of a shared heritage dating back centuries and common national interests, such as a mutual fear of Soviet influence across the Mediterranean during the Cold War, it took 38 years after the establishment of the State of Israel (1948) and a decade after Francisco Franco 's death (1975) for diplomatic relations to be formalized between Jerusalem and Madrid (1986) . It was first and foremost Spain´s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 that left Madrid with little option but to establish relations with Israel. The trigger for this diplomatic milestone proved that systemic pressure, derived from Spain's new status in the EEC, was crucial for the establishment of diplomatic ties 1 . Earlier cases in which Spain underwent or was exposed to systemic change, however, did not lead to formal ties with Israel: Madrid's entry into the international trade regime represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1963, Spain's joining the Council of Europe in 1977, the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978 and Madrid's inclusion in NATO in 1982 . Based on the Constructivist theoretical approach for analyzing international relations by identifying the forces which influence state behavior, combined with turning point decision-making analysis (TPD), this article compares the above mentioned systemic changes in the context of Spanish-Israeli relations. It does not attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the evolution of bilateral relations in between the cases identified as opportunities for change. The article highlights the unique factors which were in play with Spain's entry into the EEC and thus made the difference in 1986. 1 For a detailed account of Spain-Israel relations during the years 1948-1956 see Rein (1997) and for the period from 1956-1992 see Setton (2016) .
Historia y Política, 37, enero-junio (2017), pp. Constructivism became a leading force in International Relations (IR) theory in the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War 2 . The two other major IR paradigms, Realism and Liberalism, failed to predict the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the fall of the Soviet Union. Constructivism provided a rational explanation based on its social interpretation of global affairs 3 . For its proponents, states are the primary actors in international politics. All research into important events must therefore begin and end with states 4 . Furthermore, there is a "real" world out there, a myriad of forces, that are independent of the spectator and which are observable 5 . The international system is recognized as the cause while state actions are the effect. A change in the system may lead to an alteration in state behavior. The main variable is the relative power of the state within the system. Constructivism allows for state interests and perceptions to change over time. It seeks to identify and understand the sources of change, which are usually driven by institutionally mediated interactions at the systemic level 6 . These institutions are actual organizations, such as governmental and non-governmental groups, as well as various sets of identities and interests that do not exist apart from the participants' ideas about how the system works 7 .
Relations between nations result from the decisions made by individuals. By definition, a turning-point decision (TPD) deviates significantly from previous policy on a specific issue. For states it can result in a dramatic shift in the relationship. A TPD is generated by stimuli which influence the decision-making process. The motivation comes from a situational change in either the internal or external environment of the decision-makers. The stimulus for change passes through the decision-maker's cognitive system. Two conditions are then required to bring about a TPD. The decision-makers need to feel discomfort with the present situation they face and to believe that their new contemplated policy is the only viable option under the circumstances; the present strategy no longer provides an appropriate response 8 . In the context of Spanish-Israeli relations there were always internal and external forces which influenced the development of bilateral ties. The more obvious or visible forces included, for example: the continuous Arab challenge Marsh and Furlong (2002): 18. 6 Walt (1998): 40.
7 Griffiths et al.(2008) 10 . The historiography fittingly treats Spain as "a small power" with limited resources and capabilities yielding restricted international influence, definitely in the Middle East where the major powers were at play 11 . Spain's international position was boosted in the 1980s by its inclusion in NATO and the EEC. However, it remained all throughout at best a second tier power. Israel operated in a hostile environment, frequently involved in armed conflict with neighboring states, while facing varying levels of international isolation. Even though Jerusalem was often able to project strength in its own region, the same cannot be concluded for its position beyond the Middle East, particularly in international fora. Due to Spain's position of weakness and Israel's strategic focus, which was primarily military orientated and predominantly centered on its nearby geographic sphere of interaction, both countries had limited resources and capabilities available to pursue the development of their ties on a truly independent and bilateral basis. Unsurprisingly, the cultivation of their bilateral relationship was not perceived by either government as a primary national interest. Therefore, only under two scenarios could bilateral relations progress toward formalization. Either the establishment of diplomatic ties would not threaten other vital national interests or an external force would be powerful enough to push both sides forward toward each other, overcoming the fears, challenges and obstacles along the way. In the case of Spanish-Israeli relations it was the latter which proved true.
Actually, during the first years of Israeli statehood, Spain sought unsuccessfully to establish official ties with Israel as another means to overcome 9 For more on contemporary anti-Semitism in Spain see Álvarez Chillida (2002); Rodríguez Jiménez (2007) ; Rein and Weisz (2011) . 10 Rees (2003): 637 and Gillespie and Youngs (2000) : 1-13. 11 Balfour and Preston (1999); Rein (1999) . In a breakaway from its ethical approach to foreign policymaking, the Israeli government signed a Reparations Agreement with West Germany (1952) . Officials in Jerusalem understood that there were benefits to formal ties with Madrid, particularly in the face of growing international isolation. This change of policy came too late. By 1953 the Franco regime had reached strategic understandings with the United States and the Vatican, while it had committed itself to a "special relationship" with the Arab world 13 . Two years later, Spain finally became a full member of the United Nations. The Spanish were legitimate players in the post-war international community. Madrid no longer deemed relations with Israel of strategic value 14 . Thereafter until 1986, Spanish officials avoided calls to upgrade ties with Jerusalem. Israeli diplomats heard over and over again that Madrid did not consider that the present time "sea el momento oportuno para el establecimiento de las relaciones requeridas"
15
. There was no genuine desire to overcome the obstacles to formalizing relations with the Jewish state. The opportune moment ("momento oportuno") was illusive. Occasionally, there were pressures which challenged Spain's indifference toward Israel. Rarely was there a force capable of upgrading the bilateral relationship. The first such occurrence took place when Spain joined GATT in 1963. It became then apparent that only a powerful force, an external one at the system level, was capable of bringing about change in the relationship.
II. GATT MEMBERSHIP AND THE END OF A TRADE BOYCOTT ON ISRAEL
The Spanish leadership realized half way through the 1950s that the autarky economic system had failed. Spain had bounded itself by tariff walls, 12 For a detailed account of Spain-Israel relations during the years 1948-1956 see Rein (1997 The delegations managed to formulate an understanding for promoting bilateral trade. Solís and his Israeli counterparts agreed to four limited objectives which needed to be fulfilled for trade relations between both countries to grow: (1) termination of Spain's de facto trade embargo on Israel; (2) establishment of a bilateral trade framework between both states based on mutual most-favored nation (MFN) status; (3) formation of a private company dedicated to bilateral trade; and (4) a trade representative (unofficial and at Israel's expense) had to be appointed to manage the private company 27 . One can assume that these four objectives were reviewed by Franco. The embargo was lifted in May 1963. Franco ordered this ahead of Spain's entry into GATT. Israeli officials presumed that Solís was influential in delivering this positive result 28 . The first two objectives were the minimum required by Spain to comply with its commitment to the GATT treaty. The next two goals were limited in order to keep official Spain at a safe arm's length. Trade between both countries would be promoted by a private enterprise. There would be no official Israeli representative on Spanish soil to support this initiative. Furthermore, the Spanish government would not assume any of the costs involved in setting up this private operation and managing it thereafter. They did not have a genuine desire to significantly boost trade with Israel. If Franco would have ever had such a serious intention, as the Israeli Consul General in Lisbon noted in April 1962, then he would have asked his foreign minister at the time, Fernando María de Castiella, to take the lead in the bilateral talks Historia y Política, 37, enero-junio (2017), pp. 329-353
Still, the trade talks were most likely coordinated behind the scenes by the Palace of Santa Cruz and the Palace of El Pardo to minimize the potential fallout with the Arab bloc as a result of any progress in commercial ties with Israel expected after joining GATT. In order to guarantee that any advancement would be limited in scope and restricted to unofficial channels, Franco and Castiella likely managed the relationship with Israel through their trusted emissaries; Solís, Ullastres, and Fraga Iribarne.
At the end of the day, Spain needed to play by the rules of the international trading community if it wished to benefit as a member. Sufficient systemic pressure was created to push for change. The two conditions to generate a TPD were present once GATT membership was on the cards: (a) it was in the best interest of Franco's government, in pursuit of economic growth, to join GATT; and (b) liberalizing trade with Israel was the only viable option under the circumstances in order to comply with GATT membership rules. As a result, Spanish officials understood, albeit reluctantly, that commercial ties with Israel would need to be liberalized. In this spirit, the Spanish Ambassador to Geneva, Marquez de Minerva, was instructed as follows in June 1963: "Puede comunicar al Embajador de Israel que España, al adquirir su condición de parte contratante del GATT se consideraría obligado a la aplicación frente a este país del apartado I del Art. XIII del Acuerdo General sin discriminación"
30 . But this instruction came with much reluctance. The Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (MAE) instructed its embassies abroad on Spain's obligations to GATT with respect to commercial ties with Israel: "Es muy importante impedir cualquier acto de formalización oficial de relaciones comerciales entre España e Israel, que podría tener repercusiones muy graves en la posición de los países árabes con respecto a España…dada la delicada situación en la Asamblea General…" 31 . Castiella and the MAE were more concerned with securing Arab votes in Spain's favor at the UN General Assembly on debates concerning decolonization which could threaten Spain's hold of its territorial possessions in North Africa, specifically Ceuta, Melilla, Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea. Madrid also did not want to let any advance in relations with Israel derail the grand objective of one-day restoring Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar.
GATT Beyond the realm of trade and associated formalities, GATT did not require Spain to have full diplomatic relations with the other treaty members. Therefore, Spain complied with the treaty by paying a minimal diplomatic price in terms of its relationship with Israel and so avoided a potential fall-out with the Arabs. After all, Madrid could convincingly argue that GATT membership left it with no option but to liberalize its trade with all other member states, including Israel, and most important it did not take any additional diplomatic steps beyond the minimum required by the treaty. Meanwhile, no formal diplomatic upgrade in Spanish-Israeli relations would take place for the next two decades. 32 Maariv, 14 February 1964. 33 The shares of EDEFI were split in two, whereby 50 % were held by an Israeli partnership between ZIM Israel Navigation Company, Ltd. 
III. SPAIN'S JOINING THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS
Only after the death of Franco in late 1975 and following Madrid's embarkation on a peaceful transition process to democracy did Spain's international position begin to shift for the better. In reality, however, Spain's road to democracy was long and progress was slow. The Spanish people wanted change but they did not want to achieve it through disorder, conflict and violence. Spain in transition was burdened by economic recession, with high social frustrations and tensions, which could have easily exploded into chaos. Spanish policymakers advanced cautiously fearing that if at any point the national consensus were lost, the whole project would be in jeopardy. An upgrade in Spanish ties with Jerusalem could have been part of the transition process. It made sense to include Israel in the diplomatic push for the universalisation of foreign relations called for by King Juan Carlos I during his coronation speech at the Cortes in Madrid on 22 November 1975 36 . Yet, Spanish governments also did not want to entertain foreign policy adventures. Their diplomacy for much of the transition period was a continuation of the country's foreign policy during the Franco years. Spain was still dependent on Arab oil. For the Palaces of Zarzuela, Moncloa and Santa Cruz, relations with the Arab countries, specifically Saudi Arabia, were a top priority. They needed to limit the economic damage to Spain's fragile economy caused by record breaking energy prices. At the time Arab diplomats in Madrid threatened that there would be repercussions against Spanish business interests across the Arab world should there be a rapprochement between Madrid and Jerusalem. The Arabs threatened to limit oil supplies and to cancel a loan of US $450 million committed to the Spanish government 37 . Potential threats to Western Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands and to the freedom of navigation of Spain's fishing fleet off the coasts of North Africa remained real 38 . Arguably, Madrid could have claimed that the new state of affairs in the Middle East justified a realignment of Spain's policy toward Israel. But this landmark peace agreement was limited to Egypt and Israel. Madrid still had to take into consideration its relationship with the rest of the Arab world, from its important oil suppliers in the Persian Gulf and all the way to its neighbors closer to home in North Africa. Meanwhile, Adolfo Suárez wished to promote a "third way" foreign policy initiative, whereby advancing the Palestinian cause, and leveraging Spain's relations with the Arab world, Madrid could assist the West in countering Soviet influence spreading across the Arab and Islamic countries 42 . The Spanish government was also afraid that Cairo's realignment with the Western bloc following the Camp David Accords would lead to a rise in Soviet activities elsewhere across North Africa to compensate for the loss of Egypt. Moscow needed to ensure that its reach into the Western Mediterranean, particularly as a means to counter movements by the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet in the region during times of crisis or war, was not adversely impacted by the pro-West political shifts in the Middle East. The Americans had a substantial advantage over the Soviets in the Mediterranean. First, NATO controlled the two major straits leading into the sea; Gibraltar and the Turkish Straits. The largest air forces and naval fleets in the region were aligned with NATO. The Americans also had access to support facilities across the region. The U.S. Navy had a supportive theatre in which to operate 43 . The Soviets feared that Western influence could spread to other North African states at their expense. Therefore, the Kremlin decided to bolster its position in the region. Through a series of arrangements and less formal agreements with Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, Moscow established its first shore-based access to the western Mediterranean 44 . This advance by the Soviets threatened Spain's territorial possessions in North Africa. Madrid could not afford to jeopardize its ties with the Arab world as a result of a peace 42 Setton (2016) . Calvo Sotelo announced to the Cortes during his swearing-in speech that his foreign policy goals would be to: "conseguir para nuestro país una definición de política europea, democrática y occidental, clara e irreversible, lejos de sueños que puedan delatar una tentación aislacionista respecto del marco occidental" 46 . After the failed coup, Spain's government aspired to become a full member of the Western camp; in terms of security through NATO and politically and economically via the EEC. It therefore pursued membership negotiations with both organizations 47 . In March 1981 Spain's Foreign Minister, José Pedro Pérez Llorca, declared that Spain's transition to democracy would only be complete once Spain became a full member of the EEC 48 . Talks with the EEC, however, stalled primarily due to French resistance. The Socialist government in Paris, led by Francois Mitterrand, preferred to delay progress until after the next general elections in Spain, scheduled for the end of 1982. 45 Crespo MacLennan (2004): 227. For more on the coup of "23-F" see Reinlein (2002 Union (1979 Union ( -1985 . The détente achieved between the two blocs earlier during the same decade collapsed. By the late 1970s the EastWest rivalry in global politics heated up again and the blocs reverted back to competing against each other over their spheres of influence. The renewed tensions between the blocs was triggered by a series of events, such as the ongoing decolonization in Africa (independence of Angola and other Portuguese colonies), the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 50 . Spain's direct access to the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa, as well as its ability to provide a logistical base for U.S. activities in the Middle East, were important for NATO. The North Atlantic alliance was also weakened from inside. The tensions between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus meant that the U.S. was limited in its use of military bases in either country. There were strong Communist and Socialist political elements with anti-NATO tendencies among the organization's Mediterranean members: France, Italy and Greece. Spain's accession to NATO not only strengthened the organization from a military perspective but it also gave it a political boost 51 . Altogether, NATO was eager for Spanish involvement. There was no call on Madrid to establish diplomatic ties with Israel, especially since the Jewish state was not a formal member of the North Atlantic alliance. Consequently, NATO could not be the mechanism at the international system level to apply pressure on Spain to advance its ties with Israel 52 . Beyond the context of NATO, the issue of Spanish-Israeli relations did come up here and there in meetings with foreign heads of state and politicians with their Spanish 49 Crespo MacLennan (2004) 
V. ENTRY TO THE EEC AND THE NORMALIZATION OF TIES WITH ISRAEL
Even though there were no major diplomatic breakthroughs in the bilateral relationship during the years 1976-1982, there was an understanding on both sides that the status quo would not last much longer. As the transition progressed and Spanish EEC membership approached there was little doubt in Madrid that relations with Israel would be upgraded. In December 1984, the Spanish daily Cambio 16 reported that Spain's Prime Minister, Felipe González, repeatedly told his European colleagues that Spain would establish 53 The government of Calvo Sotelo was ready to formalize ties by early summer of 1982. However, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 derailed this plan. The government in Madrid could not justify the initiative, especially as the Spanish media was united in condemnation of the Israeli aggression. The opportunity resurfaced again in September that year as the Calvo Sotelo government thought that despite the Middle East crisis, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel could generate favourable sentiment amongst the Spanish electorate in their favour, with the PSOE already ahead in the public opinion polls just one month before the scheduled general election. Pérez-Llorca was scheduled to meet with Israeli Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir in New York in 16 September 1982 at the UN General Assembly and to announce the exchange of ambassadors. Just before the meeting was to take place, reports spread worldwide of the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Palestinian and Shiite Muslim civilians in Beirut (16-18 September 1982) carried out by Christian Phalangist militia allied with Israel. Again, this was deemed not to be the "opportune moment" the Spanish sought for establishing ties with Israel. Consequently, the initiative never materialized. In essence, nothing happened in June and September 1982 since there was no international systematic pressure at the time to force Spain into normalizing ties with Israel or to neutralize any Arab threat of retaliation should a rapprochement take place; see Setton (2016) Rafael (1981): 358. diplomatic relations with Israel after its accession to the EEC: "En cuanto al establecimiento de relaciones, Felipe González dice a sus interlocutores europeos que lo hará ´después´ del ingreso español en la CEE" 55 . Indeed, nothing would happen before 1 January 1986. On 24 December 1984, Ya reported that at the PSOE 30 th Conference, Felipe González told the Labor Party Member of Knesset, Michael Harish, that Spain: "establecerá relaciones con Israel en próximos meses, a más tardar en enero de 1986 (fecha en que está previsto el ingreso de España en la Comunidad Económica Europea)" 56 . In comparison to earlier times, the mid-1980s were undoubtedly the most comfortable time for Madrid to establish ties with Israel. Spanish military concerns related to its territorial possessions in North Africa were reduced. Madrid was aware of the diminished military capabilities of the North African states. The political divisions amongst these countries did not go unnoticed. These reduced the chance that a strong and united front would materialize into a credible threat against Spanish interests. Furthermore, Spain's membership in NATO added to the sense of security amongst the decision makers in Madrid. Spain wisely increased its interdependence with North Africa through a series of defense and collaboration treaties 57 . Meanwhile, there was a growing recognition amongst the Arab countries that the formalization of Israeli-Spanish relations was for all practical purposes a done deal. Furthermore, Arab opposition to such a move was seriously weakened once Egypt, a major Arab power, had recognized the The Spanish Prime Minister wished to regain Spain's position from centuries earlier as a European power. He needed a tabula rasa to do so which also meant resolving the anomaly of Spanish-Israeli relations. His foreign minister, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, also admitted in an interview with Diario 16 in March 1986 that: "Una vez dentro de la CEE era insostenible no mantener relaciones diplomáticas con Israel" 59 .
To avoid this unwanted situation, the state of affairs with Israel needed to be normalized sooner rather than later. In parallel, Israel launched an aggressive and effective diplomatic campaign linking Spain's EEC membership and the normalization of relations with Jerusalem. Israeli diplomats made every effort to ensure that the issue remained on the diplomatic agenda so that Spanish officials could not avoid the issue 60 . In May 1985, the Israel Embassy in Paris reported: "With respect to the diplomatic relations with Spain which was raised by the Ambassador, (Roland) Dumas ordered to include the subject on the agenda of the Franco-Spanish summit which will take place in France this month" 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is important to point out that by the mid-1980s Spanish confidence was at an all-time high due to the combined military, political and economic protection which NATO and EEC membership provided. This enabled Madrid for the first time to overcome its fears of possible Arab reprisals to a rapprochement with Israel. The Spanish were aware of the diminished military capabilities of the North African states, the unlikelihood that they would unite into one front against Spain, all while relations improved markedly with the key potential aggressors; Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. In addition, by the mid-1980s, Spain's dependence on Arab oil diminished. For their part, the Arab countries understood that their leverage on Spain decreased substantially into the 1980s. They probably never imagined that a Spanish rapprochement with Israel would take so long. In fact, only Iran and Kuwait recalled their Ambassadors from the Spanish capital after the relations were established. Both heads of mission returned a bit later to their posts as if nothing happened 71 . Years later, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Spain's Foreign Minister from 2004-2010 and Bernardino León, a leading Spanish career diplomat and politician, admitted that the normalization of ties with Israel did not have any adverse effect on Spain's relations with the Arab world 72 . It is evident from the above analysis that the only force which was capable of changing the state of affairs between Spain and Israel was strong and concentrated pressure coming from the international system. Systemic pressures were bearing down on decision makers in Madrid to change their policy toward Israel, convincing them that the benefits from a policy change outweighed the rewards resulting from the status quo overshadowed by its fears of falling out with the Arab world. Leading up to the summer of 1963, Spain's leadership faced a classic turning point decision situation. They understood that it was in Spain's best interest to join the international trade regime under GATT. They desperately sought to pursue economic growth and overcome the failures of its autarky economic system. Spain needed to play by the rules of the international trading community if it wished for its economy to grow. Israel was also a signatory to GATT and for Madrid to benefit from the international trade regime it had to comply with the basic requirement to liberalize trade affairs with all the other signatories to the agreement. Consequently, sufficient systemic pressure was created to push for change in the bilateral relationship, even though it was only limited to trade affairs. Since GATT did 71 Ya, 22 January 1986 and El País, 23 January 1986. 72 Moratinos and León (2002): 112. not require full normalization of ties between its participants, Spain did not advance its relationship with Israel any further than the absolute minimum required by the rules of the international trade regime. Just like with GATT membership, no preconditions were placed on Madrid with regards to its relationship with Jerusalem when it came to Spain's membership in the Council of Europe in 1977 or in NATO in 1982. Nor did the Spanish face any serious direct or indirect diplomatic pressure orchestrated by Jerusalem to upgrade ties with Israel in 1963 , 1977 and 1982 . This, however, was different in 1985 . The coordinated Israeli diplomatic effort across European capitals and beyond, to link Spain's admittance to the EEC with the formalization of ties with the Jewish state, was the main driving force for Spain's informal commitment made to the other Community members that it would do so shortly after January 1986. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs should get the credit for having pushed Felipe González into promising his EEC counterparts that relations with Israel would be formalized once Spain's ascension was accomplished. Anyhow, Spain would have had to normalize ties with Israel at the very latest by January 1989, since it could not effectively assume the role of President of the Council of the EEC, without having ties with a country which had full diplomatic relations with all the other Community members. Spain could not represent the Community, especially as President of the Council, in its pursuit to contribute to peace efforts in the Middle East without having ties with both sides of the conflict. Felipe González understood that waiting until 1989 was not a viable foreign policy. His government had to establish formal ties with Israel as soon as possible in 1986 in order to complete the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy as a member of the EEC. In doing so he achieved for Spain what Franco could only dream of attaining; Middle Power status. This was the highest international position for Spain since the Disaster of 1898 when it was defeated by the U.S. and lost the remnants of its colonial empire (Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines). Unsurprisingly, when all was said and done, Felipe González asked during a televised interview following the establishment of diplomatic ties: "In any case, what did we achieve by not having relations with Israel?" 73 .
